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News of the Month
The transition of power is over
The transition of power after a presidential run-off 
about five weeks ago is over in Ukraine. Although 
former Premier Yulia Tymoshenko initially refused 
to recognize the victory of her rival, Viktor Yanu-
kovych, it was a peaceful transition. As the third 
peaceful transition of power in Ukraine, the coun-
try’s democratic achievements—rare among FSU 
countries—merits applause.
The executive now stands consolidated with Presi-
dent Viktor Yanukovych and Premier Mykola Az-
arov from the same party and supported by a ma-
jority in the Verkhovna Rada that is both pro-presi-
dential and pro-Cabinet. This fact alone should 
improve the government’s ability to reach decisions 
and to implement them, which will greatly improve 
Ukraine’s short-term prospects.
Financial markets have reacted positively both in 
Ukraine and abroad to the swift transition:
Risk premiums paid on external Ukraine’s sover-
eign debt went down.
Ukraine’s stock market has gained 47% since the 
beginning of the year, one of the best results for 
world stock markets.
Credit ratings, both sovereign and some corpo-
rate, improved slightly. 
However, the short-term benefits of the fast transi-
tion are counter-balanced by the lack of long-term 
stability in the current power set-up. The postpone-
ment of local elections, breaking the rules in cob-
bling a coalition, and the public uproar over some 
appointments are all factors that will undermine the 
long-term stability of the current Government, leav-
ing the threat of a snap Rada election in the air.
 http://www.businessweek.com/news/200-03-5/
ukraine-stocks-climb-to-highest-since-june-2008-on-
imf-budget.html 
•
•
•
Coalition building: Mission complete
On 2 March, Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn dissolved 
the “democratic coalition,” as it failed to provide 
enough deputy signatures. The next day, the VR 
passed a vote of non-confidence in the Tymoshenko 
Government.
After a week of fruitless negotiations among fac-
tions, it became clear that neither BYT nor NU-NS, 
the second and third largest factions in the legisla-
ture, would join a coalition with Party of the Regions. 
But with individual members of each faction willing 
to consider such a coalition, the situational major-
ity amended the VR Regulations to allow a coalition 
to be made not only of factions, as required by the 
Constitution, but also of individual deputies2.
The “Stability and Reform” coalition was formed 
on  March, consisting of 235 deputies: the Party 
of the Regions (PR), Communist Party (CPU) and 
Volodymyr Lytvyn Bloc (VLB) factions in their en-
tirety, plus 6 deputies who crossed the aisle—six 
each from BYT and NU-NS, and four others who had 
left these factions earlier.
Deputies from both ruling and opposition factions 
have requested the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
to rule on the legitimacy of the new coalition. The 
President pledged to call snap elections should 
the Court recognize that the coalition-building ap-
proach violated the Constitution.
Moreover, the new coalition still has not proved its 
decision-making capacity, as there have so far been 
no votes on bills that might be divisive.
2 Legislation states that a deputy, who leaves the faction 
should lose the mandate. However, voting against the 
faction is permitted. It is unclear why BYT and NUNS 
faction do not insist on implementation of this norm.
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Silence of the oppositions
After the fall of her Government, Ms. Tymoshenko 
went into opposition and on 6 March, the three BYT 
bloc parties and the five NU-NS bloc parties signed 
an agreement to establish an official opposition. 
Since Yulia Tymoshenko is not a sitting deputy, she 
became head of the opposition’s coordinating coun-
cil and made Serhiy Sobolev, a BYT leader, premier 
in the shadow Cabinet.
Other groups within NU-NS announced that they 
would form “alternative” oppositions. After talks 
with Viktor Yanukovych about his possible role in a 
pro-presidential government went nowhere, Arseniy 
Yatseniuk, the third runner-up in the Presidential 
race, declared that in a matter of weeks he would 
present his own shadow Cabinet. Another NU-NS 
group Za Ukrainu led by Viacheslav Kyrylenko ap-
parently has no intention of joining any of the oppo-
sition groups, remaining in a political limbo.
So far, no actions by the President or Government 
action has caused major opposition comment.
Appointments
Not only did the President manage to secure a PR-
led coalition in the legislature, but he also had his 
close ally appointed as Premier. Mykola Azarov, a 
former tax czar, First Deputy Premier and Minister 
of Finance in both Yanukovych  Governments, is a 
technocrat who will have to make a great number 
of unpopular decisions. This appointment brought 
a long-awaited end to the standoff and confronta-
tion between President and Premier in Ukraine. Ser-
hiy Liovochkin was appointed Chief-of-Staff in the 
Presidential Administration.
The new Cabinet of Ministers has a number of min-
isters with interests in big business. Andriy Kliuyev 
became First Deputy Premier, Borys Kolesnikov was 
appointed Deputy Premier for EURO-202 prepara-
tions, and Yuriy Boyko is now Minister of Fuel and 
Energy. Somewhat unexpectedly, Serhiy Tihipko, 
who was second runner-up in the Presidential elec-
tion, took up his new position as Deputy Premier for 
the economy. He did that not only to the contrary to 
his previous statements, but also agreed to a man-
date with little capacity to implement his agenda.
Despite the seeming consolidation of the executive 
branch, some appointments could lead to competition 
between Presidential Administration and the Cabinet 
of Ministers, though to a lesser degree compared  to 
what happened under Viktor Yushchenko. Moreover, 
there are different business groups and interests rep-
resented within the Cabinet of Ministers itself.
Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, a former Ambassador to 
the US and to Russia, is now Minister of foreign af-
fairs and Mykhailo Yezhel, a former Navy Admiral, 
is Minister of Defense, the two positions directly ap-
pointed by the President. The appointment of Dmy-
tro Tabachnyk, who has been criticized for his views 
of Ukraine’s history and for remarks about Ukraini-
ans from Western Ukraine, as Minister of Education 
and Science created a national uproar.
Other important appointments include those of bil-
lionaire Valeriy Khoroshkovsky as chief of the SBU, 
the state security service, and Yevhen Bakulin as 
president of NAK Naftogaz, Ukraine’s natural gas 
monopoly.
Governors have already been changed in 7 oblasts. 
Both the Speaker and the Premier of Crimea were 
also changed. The bosses of law enforcement agen-
cies in many regions were replaced by representa-
tives from Donetsk Oblast.
Like the 2006 Yanukovych government, the 200 Az-
arov government has only men. However, some key 
positions in the Yanukovych Administration have 
been filled by women from PR, including: Iryna Aki-
mova, First Deputy Chief-of-Staff and President’s 
Representative in the Cabinet of Ministers; Olena 
Lukash, First Deputy Chief-of-Staff and President’s 
Representative in the Constitutional Court; and 
Hanna Herman, Deputy Chief-of-Staff.
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Visits West and East
President Yanukovych’s first official trip was to 
Brussels on  March. Mr. Viktor Yanukovych suc-
ceeded in showing himself as a European politician 
and a potentially reliable partner for the EU. The 
President of the European Commission pledged to 
conclude the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, 
provide macro-financial assistance, and introduce 
visa-free travel for Ukrainians. President Yanu-
kovych confirmed the country’s goal to deepen po-
litical and economic cooperation with the EU.
On 5 March, Mr. Yanukovych made his first official 
visit to Moscow. The Moscow trip lacked much of a 
working agenda, compared to Brussels, because of 
the long decline in relations between Ukraine and 
Russia. Russian Federation President Dmitri Med-
vedev promised to revive the interstate bilateral 
commission, promote cooperation in energy and 
economic areas, and support the Ukrainian diaspo-
ra in Russia. It is likely that more specific points in 
Ukraine-Russia relations will be decided at the level 
of Premiers, between Mykola Azarov and Vladimir 
Putin.
In both capitals, Viktor Yanukovych assured his 
hosts that he would seek pragmatic, neighborly re-
lations with them, and, thus, launched his multi-vec-
tor foreign policy.
Testing President Yanukovych and his new team
European Choice. Although President Yanukovych’s first foreign trip was to Brussels where he said that European integra-
tion was a key priority in Ukraine’s foreign policy, he also added that Ukraine’s other priority was to enhance relations with 
Russia. Moreover, there is not a single word about European integration in the new coalition agreement, while there is a 
paragraph on strengthening mechanisms for bilateral relations with the Russian Federation and a paragraph on economic 
integration in the post-Soviet arena based on Ukraine’s national interests. The post of Deputy Premier for European Inte-
gration was dropped and the Cabinet Committee on European Integration and International Co-operation shut down. 
European integration is now the purview of Deputy Premier for the Economy Serhiy Tihipko.
Democracy. Enabling individual VR deputies to enter the coalition dealt a serious blow to the core of representative de-
mocracy in Ukraine, since deputies receive their mandate on the basis of proportional representation in Ukraine. However, 
President Yanukovych pledged to respect any decision of the Constitutional Court and to call a snap VR election if the 
coalition is ruled unconstitutional..
Rule of Law. Despite a 2008 official ruling by the Constitutional Court of Art. 83 of the Constitution of Ukraine about co-
alitions of factions, President Yanukovych signed a law amending the VR regulations to allow a coalition to be formed by 
individual deputies, rather than by factions alone. While this move was largely contrived in the name of stability, it sets a 
clear precedent for further disregard for the Constitution. The forthcoming ruling by the Constitutional Court should make 
clear what can be expected further.
Human Rights. In addition to the fact that there is not a single woman among 29 ministers in the Cabinet, Premier Azarov 
also stated publicly that it was “not women’s business to implement reforms” in Ukraine. This remark from a top govern-
ment official caused outrage among human rights organizations in Ukraine and accusations of gender discrimination. 
Premier Azarov, not known for his refined speech, later claimed that his words had been distorted.
Fighting Corruption. Among his first decrees, President Yanukovych established a National Anti-Corruption Committee. 
As strongly recommended by international organizations, President Yanukovych vetoed the law on state procurements, 
which was criticized for containing loopholes that would allow corruption by concentrating all state procurement func-
tions in the hands of the Economy Minister. Premier Azarov also declared eliminating corruption as his priority and pointed 
out that a system without corruption could be established by following a “one-stop shop” principle for state registration 
of commercial activity, transparent state purchases, and the allocation of land. But just before the new Cabinet was ap-
pointed, the Verkhovna Rada again postponed the coming into force until 2011 of an entire range of anti-corruption laws 
adopted in June 2009.
Civil Service Reform. So far, President Yanukovych’s efforts in this area have amounted to reducing the number of staff in 
his Administration and spending on the government machine. He also gave hope in one of his speeches by stating public 
administration needed to be reformed in Ukraine.
Judicial Reform. In March, President Yanukovych set up a Committee on judicial reform and the justice system with-
in his Administration and put together a working group on judiciary reform. Chaired by Minister of Justice Oleksandr 
Lavrynovych, the group must submit its proposals by the end of April. However, critics warn that these efforts are only 
superficially aimed at an independent and efficient judicial branch, which will be simply yet another battlefield for the 
redistribution of powers, including cutting those of the Supreme Court of Ukraine.
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From short-term risks to medium-term 
tasks
Burning roof or rotting basement?
When the roof of a house is burning and its base-
ment is rotting, the best advice would be to extin-
guish the fire first and then tackle the basement. 
Ukraine is in a similar situation. Short-term risks 
generated by the fiscal gap have become too high 
and require the Government’s immediate attention. 
These short-term risks can be dealt with using a se-
ries of stop-gap solutions that can be implemented 
in a few months.
Apart from dealing with such emergencies, Ukraine 
also needs a more strategic reform effort addressing 
the fundamentals of its future development. Strate-
gic reforms will require much more effort, prepara-
tion and resolve than the stop-gap efforts needed to 
handle the challenges of today.
Ukraine’s current situation requires a decisive gov-
ernment that should not care much about its imme-
diate popularity. It would be better to concentrate 
on the next 2 months, as conditions make planning 
for a longer term meaningless. However, the govern-
ment cannot afford a poor communications policy. 
Both its short-term and medium-term actions will 
need to be carefully explained to the public to be 
truly successful. 
Ukraine needs one to two years to put its economy 
back on track. The window of opportunity for re-
forms is open right now for several reasons: the next 
Presidential election is five years off, voters are ready 
for change, the government is consolidated, and has 
declared its readiness to satisfy demands for reform 
from international financial institutions (IFIs). 
The tasks are clear, the opportunity to implement 
them is there, and the risks of not stepping through 
Issue of the Month
the open door considerable. Other than the reforms 
of the Yushchenko Government in 999-2000 and 
the half-baked Constitutional “reform” of 2004, 
Ukraine has not seen much in the way of reforms in 
the last decade. Officials keep paying lip-service to 
the reform agenda and making promises to western 
partners, who have spent millions of dollars on re-
form advice to Ukraine that has come at regular in-
tervals but never been followed.
There is a risk that only superficial remedies will be 
applied to the current short-term problems Ukraine 
is facing. The reasons for Ukraine’s problems to-
day are rooted, not in the world economic crisis, 
but in Ukraine’s malfunctioning institutions. For 
more structural solutions to take place, careful and 
honest analysis is necessary of why the ample ad-
vice and requests for reforms of the past nine years 
have fallen on deaf ears among Ukraine’s policy-
 makers.
Unfortunately, Ukrainian officials were further let 
off the hook by the West in 2009. They discovered 
that the IMF could step into the breach and finance 
a Budget deficit with no severe repercussions when 
Ukraine violated the conditions of the loan. 
Any success in this coming year will have to be 
planted in this coming month. The Government 
has to show that it is ready to do more than hastily 
put out fires and to step up with a set of proactive 
reform measures. Also, a credible plan needs to be 
proposed for streamlining Ukraine’s bloated public 
sector as part of any proposed reform agenda. 
The Government has pledged to be professional, 
but it remains to be seen if it will adopt the approach 
necessary to implement changes under a democra-
cy and market economy. IFIs will have to stand firm 
and require performance first to deliver rewards 
later. These preconditions seem vital for Ukraine to 
fast-track to a better development trajectory.
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Step 1: Extinguish the burning roof
The main question facing the Government now is 
definitely not massive and strategic structural re-
forms. The questions for March are: () how to re-
vise the 200 Budget and reduce the deficit and (2) 
where to find the money to finance the fiscal gap in 
a non-inflationary manner.
Carrots for an unpleasant job
The 200 Budget will be crucial in luring the IMF 
back into the country with its frozen tranche of US 
$3.8bn. The EU is ready to give Ukraine almost 
€60mn if the country reaches a new agreement with 
the IMF. The World Bank and other IFIs are wait-
ing for the green light from IMF to restore their 
programs with Ukraine as well. This, in turn, means 
restoring the confidence of private investors and 
lenders and easier access for Ukraine to money on 
international credit markets.
Restoring shaken confidence in Ukraine’s mac-
roeconomic stability will not be easy. It will mean 
stabilizing public finances, curbing inflation and in-
creasing efforts at stabilizing the banking industry. 
To achieve this, the Government will have to un-
dertake stop-gap measures in a variety of sensitive 
 areas.
The IMF mission arrived in Kyiv on 23 March and 
immediately started the negotiations on restoring 
co-operation with Ukraine. Premier Azarov said 
that he was interested in either restoring the previ-
ous program or starting a new multi-year program 
to support Ukrainian reforms. It is expected that a 
decision will be passed by the IMF after it reviews 
the draft 200 Budget.
Mend those public coffers!
In 2009, Ukraine’s Government undertook massive 
borrowing at high interest rates to maintain the level 
of spending of the boom years. Public debt soared 
from 9.9% of GDP in 2008 to 33% in 2009. This level 
is still within a tolerable range, compared to other 
CEE countries, but the idea of financing regular 
Budget commitments with incessant borrowing 
must be abandoned. 
Government officials have so far been reluctant to 
speak about public spending cuts. The populist Law 
“On raising social standards,” adopted in the heat of 
the Presidential race will cost an additional UAH 24-
28bn, which Deputy Premier for the Economy Ser-
hiy Tihipko insists “will be in the 200 Budget.”3 But 
the IMF had demanded of the previous President, 
Viktor Yushchenko, that he veto the bill. 
The IMF has asked Ukraine’s Government to keep 
the deficit under 4% in 200. “We had a deficit of 
almost 2% of GDP last year, so to run a deficit of 4% 
this year will be impossible,” says Iryna Akimova, 
First Deputy Chief-of-Staff. The government will 
most likely settle for a compromise on fiscal gap tar-
gets.
Mildly positive economic outlook for 2010   
Item Consensus forecast
Gov’t 
estimates
GDP growth, y-o-y 3.5%-4% 3.7%
Inflation (CPI av y-o-y) 13.3% 13.1%
Budget deficit/GDP 4.4%-9.8% 4.5%-5.0%4
Public debt/GDP5 36% ?
An improving economic outlook could, unfortu-
nately, relax Ukraine’s public officials. The hryvnia 
has stabilized and the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU) started to buy up currency on forex markets. 
The recent 60% depreciation of the hryvnia and re-
covery on external markets for Ukraine’s commodi-
ties have improved the country’s overall growth 
outlook. Ukraine is slowly getting its international 
creditworthiness back. The banking system is not 
nearly as unbalanced as in 2009 after the Govern-
ment’s recapitalization drive, capital injections by 
foreign banks into their Ukrainian subsidiaries, and 
the recovery of deposit inflows.
This picture may be comforting, but the foundation 
is still too wobbly to depend on. The main risk factor 
now is Ukraine’s fiscal gap. Hard decisions around 
3 http://www.interfax.com.ua/rus/eco/34207
4 Excluding transfers to NAK Naftogaz.
5 Raiffeisen Bank Aval, Monthly Economic and Risks 
Monitoring Review for March 200.
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public spending adjustments that were put off dur-
ing the Presidential election are still waiting to be 
made.
O where, o where has my wee pension gone?
Ukraine is suffering from steep growth in pensions. 
Pension Fund expenditures grew from 9% of GDP in 
2003 to 6% by the end of 2008, one of the highest 
pension spending ratios in the world, according to 
the OECD.6
World Bank in its suggested reform agenda for 
Ukraine7 notes that Ukraine’s current pension sys-
tem is “unsustainable” in the long-term. If demo-
graphic trends remain as they are, by 2055 there will 
be .43 pensioners for every worker contributing to 
the system.
Yet serious risks are not that far away. The Pension 
Fund already runs short of cash in its day-to-day 
operations, which causes it to siphon money from 
public coffers. On 9 March, the State Budget trans-
ferred UAH bn as a loan to the Pension Fund.8 The 
Ministry of Finance promises that pension payments 
will be according to a schedule from now on, but just 
how credible are such promises?
Ukraine’s pension system must be rapidly rebal-
anced by:
Abandoning the system of “special and privi-
leged” pensions, a move that will require law-
makers to vote cuts to their own absurdly gener-
ous pensions.
Indexing pensions only against inflation and not 
against levels promised in the heat of the recent 
Presidential campaign.
Raising the retirement age, currently at 55 for 
women and 60 for men.
6 Dmitriy Sologoub, “Ukraine: A story of boom and 
bust”.
7 Making Ukraine Stronger Post-Crisis, http://sitere-
sources.worldbank.org/INTUKRAINE/News%20and
%20Events/22505904/PolicyNotesFinalEng.pdf
8 http://www.minfin.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/
article?art_id=244779&cat_id=53608
•
•
•
Capping pensions for pensioners who are still 
drawing salaries, as well as capping pensions in 
absolute terms rather than calculating them as a 
multiple of the subsistence minimum.
“Gas attacks” on the public purse
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko reforms in 999-2000 im-
proved the situation in the gas sector considerably. 
Payment discipline grew, rates started to approach 
cost-covering levels. And the quasi-fiscal deficit—
the hidden subsidies to consumers at the expense of 
state enterprises—started to dwindle.
Starting in 2006, however, the situation began to 
deteriorate again. Steeply rising prices for gas im-
ported from Russia were not passed along to domes-
tic users. NAK Naftogaz, Ukraine’s state gas mo-
nopoly, which bought imported Russian gas at the 
new prices and sold it to consumers at a loss, found 
itself subsidizing consumers at an alarmingly grow-
ing rate.
NAK Naftogaz received overall 2.5% of GDP in sup-
port from the state to save the company from im-
minent default in 2009. The NBU began spending 
its foreign currency reserves to prop up Naftogaz, 
which was struggling to pay for the Russian gas.
In Q’0, Naftogaz is scheduled to receive UAH 3bn 
or around US $375mn to cover losses from inappro-
priate gas rate policies.9 With Ukraine among the 
Top 0 countries for gas consumption in the world, 
the luxury of hidden gas subsidies is too expensive 
to be afforded.
Residential gas rates were not revised since 2008. 
Today, the rates cover about 60% of what the gas 
actually costs to deliver. The difference simply falls 
on NAK Naftogaz and is siphoned out of the public 
purse, one way or another. Not only this situation 
prone to opacity, but it also increases Ukraine’s fis-
cal gap and negatively affects the economy.
9 http://ua.bgcapital.ge/en/news/490/
•
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Actual vs cost-covering10 gas rates 
USD/1,000 cu m
Fortunately, there seems to be consensus on the 
need to raise both gas and heating rates. World 
Bank experts recommend an immediate 00% rise in 
rates, avoiding gradualism as there is no time for in-
cremental improvements anymore. Serhiy Tihipko, 
Deputy Premier for the economy, also admitted that 
rates needed to be raised. However, he announced 
that rates would be raised for the rich, that is, “for 
those who are able to pay them.” At the same time, 
Deputy Premier Kliuyev noted that if Ukraine set up 
a gas consortium with Russia, gas rates could remain 
unchanged.
The critical point of payment discipline is missing in 
all this discourse. Rates for gas and heating can be 
raised, but what will happen if people simply stop 
paying their bills? In January 200, residential us-
ers paid only 69.9% of what they owed for residential 
services. Arrears for public utilities rose .%2 in 
January.
Local elections may become another barrier to rais-
ing utility rates. Adjusting heating rates requires un-
popular decisions by local councils, a step that they 
will find difficult to make. World Bank suggests that 
this barrier could be overcome by setting up a cen-
tral regulator in the utility sector just for 200.
0 According to NAK Naftogaz.
 http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/4ba8b88e05449/
2 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/express/expr200/03_
0/50.zip
The rate policy question lays bare the ineffective-
ness of state regulation on monopoly markets. The 
notion that Ukraine’s government should raise gas 
rates is absurd. Nobody seems to remember that the 
National Energy Regulation Commission (NERC), 
an “independent” regulator on the gas and elec-
tricity markets, is supposed to automatically adjust 
rates to costs. But the NERC and other regulators 
have never managed to overcome their status as an 
appendage to the Cabinet of Ministers.
Watch out for failing banks!
Ukraine’s financial system was saved from collapse 
in 2009, but it still requires constant attention from 
policy-makers. Only a handful of banks have hon-
estly acknowledged the level of bad loans in their 
portfolios. More banks may require recapitalization 
or begin liquidation procedures in 200 and Ukraini-
an Government and the NBU will have to act swiftly 
to maintain stability in the banking system.
A solution is still to be found for the ailing Nadra 
Bank, the biggest problem haunting the banking 
industry now. Nadra has not found an investor so 
far and the Government is not keen to put public 
money into this venture. So Nadra continues to ma-
linger, the butt of continuous horror stories in the 
press.
Instead of moving fast with recapitalization and liq-
uidation, sometimes Ukrainian banks enjoy months 
and months of “temporary” administration, which 
decreases the value of their assets and raises suspi-
cions of vested interests and corruption in play.
The Government needs to increase the speed and 
decisiveness of its actions with problematic banks: 
they should be either quickly recapitalized or quick-
ly liquidated. The Government should also under-
take some measures to reduce the vulnerability of 
the banking system to vested interests. Ownership 
of banks should be disclosed and the central bank 
should be insulated from political influence.
Indeed, the NBU’s reputation needs improvement. 
Rumors around opaque recapitalization policies and 
suspect interventions on the forex market all have 
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come short of direct accusations, but still this dam-
ages the reputation of the country’s central bank.
Insulating the National Bank from political influ-
ence would contribute greatly to restoring faith in 
Ukraine’s macroeconomic stability. The main step 
on this road would be to banish politicians from the 
NBU’s Council, central bank supervisory body. This 
Council consists of 5 members: the NBU Gover-
nor, 7 members appointed by the President, and 7 
appointed by the Rada. Currently, the chair is Petro 
Poroshenko, whose term is running out.
Amendments to legislation aimed at depoliticiz-
ing the NBU Council recently failed to pass in the 
Rada.3 It is hard for politicians themselves to give 
up their quotas on the Council. Some politicians on 
the NBU Council are also very closely tied to com-
mercial banks in Ukraine. Eliminating vested inter-
ests from the NBU Council is a must to start restor-
ing the independence of Ukraine’s central bank. 
Taxes: Close loopholes, resist extortion
Tax breaks were increased from 2008 to 2009, with 
half of the volume lost due to VAT breaks. The new 
Government has begun to talk about announcing tax 
holidays on profits for hotels and small businesses.
The Government will have to rethink its tax policies 
and cancel old while not announcing new breaks. 
The simplified tax regime should be restricted to 
small businesses as many enterprises currently use 
it to reduce their tax burden. 
While closing loopholes, the Government should 
also stop running VAT arrears. Currently, the vol-
ume of VAT arrears is around UAH 25bn. The prac-
tice of advance tax payments should also be termi-
nated.
Premier Azarov, who originally established 
Ukraine’s tax administration, gave rise to the term 
3 http://www.uabanker.net/daily/200/02/0280_
630.shtml
azarovshchyna, meaning a pushy, arbitrary ap-
proach to raising taxes. On one hand, that experi-
ence can help increase Budget revenues; on the oth-
er, this could push businesses back into the shadow 
economy. 
On 2 March, then-Premier Tymoshenko signed a 
Cabinet resolution adopting a Plan to bring employ-
ee income out of the shadows.4 Among other things, 
this plan provides for such measures as monitoring 
salaries in job ads and comparing them to officially 
paid salaries. This plan basically risks turning into 
a tax extortion campaign by the tax authorities and 
social funds. It is also likely that the burden of this 
campaign will mainly fall on SMEs.
The Government faces a difficult task. It has to resist 
two powerful magnets—rents from interest groups 
and tax loopholes—and the temptation to resort to 
tax extortion and running VAT arrears.
Step 2: Clean up the rotting basement
Window of opportunity: closing fast
The best time for reforms was last year, when the 
economic crisis was at its peak. Such times are best 
for administering radical and even unpopular de-
cisions, as voters are ready for change and interest 
groups are weakened by the economic decline.
Ukraine’s window of opportunity for reforms is clos-
ing fast. Local elections loom, the economy shows 
signs of recovery, and interest groups are eager to 
get payback for what they invested in the Presiden-
tial race.
The cost of wasting the current opportunity will be 
truly immense. The country is finally stable enough 
to allow for reforms and voters are still willing to em-
brace them. Wasting the opportunity to put Ukraine 
on track for sustainable growth now means losing 
potential benefits for years and years to come.
4 http://news.yurist-online.com/laws/4293/
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Where’s that rotten smell coming from?
The causes of the current rot in Ukraine’s econ-
omy are hidden mainly in the bad policy choices 
the country’s leaders opted for during the growth 
years:
Based not on growing productivity but on ex-
panding existing capacities and easy credit, eco-
nomic growth was not made sustainable. 
The governments immediately spent any money 
generated during the economic boom on con-
sumption rather than invested in infrastructure 
or created a cushion for a possible recession. 
The vulnerabilities of Ukraine’s economy were 
never addressed: the high dependence on steel 
•
•
•
International rankings: 
Economic freedom is a must!
Last in the region for economic freedom. Ukraine won 
political freedoms during the Orange Revolution, but 
now it needs to conquer the second height, economic 
freedoms. In the Index of Economic Freedom, Ukraine 
occupies a shabby 162nd place—between Togo and 
Liberia—and comes last on the continent.
Corruption dragging development. The country is 
bogged down in corruption, with public officials per-
ceived as the most corrupt group in Ukrainian society, 
followed by elected deputies and the judiciary. On the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Ukraine has plunged 
from 99th in 2006 to 146th in 2009.
Sustainable growth under doubt. Ukraine’s prospects 
for sustainable economic growth driven by productivity 
gains are not promising at the moment. In the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI), Ukraine fell from 73rd 
place in 2007 to 83rd place in 2009. The GCI assesses 
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level 
of productivity that, in turn, sets the sustainable current 
and medium-term levels of economic prosperity.
exports made the country’s economy hostage to 
external commodity market conditions.
To address these problems, the government needs 
to be determined to address the roots and not the 
symptoms of economic problems. Unfortunately, 
there is a high risk that pretend reforms and half-
measures will be the path of the Azarov Government 
as well, once the most urgent current problems are 
alleviated.
Successful strategic reforms require the Govern-
ment to move swiftly and to fulfill at least two condi-
tions: get the priorities right and have the capacity 
for reform.
Right now, there are many reform proposals on the 
table, but most of them boil down to four:
Set up an executive agency to manage reforms.
Build capacity to implement reforms.
Redefine state involvement in the economy, such 
as in the gas sector.
Get Ukraine on track for sustainable growth.
Who will do the cleaning up?
It is irrational to expect a corrupt and inefficient bu-
reaucracy to reform itself. So there is little alterna-
tive but to set up a separate body to manage with 
reforms. Such a body, the Committee for Reforms, 
has already been set up, but not under the Cabinet 
of Ministers as would be expected, but under the 
Presidential Administration. Moreover, the Com-
mittee has so far functioned, not as an executive, but 
as an advisory body.
•
•
•
•
Inside Ukraine, #6, March 2010
12
President Yanukovych himself chairs the commit-
tee. During the first meeting, he set five areas of re-
form that he sees as priority:5
5 http://www.president.gov.ua/news/6760.html
Focusing on sustainable economic develop-
ment, positive business climate and investment 
appeal;
Updating technologies across the economy and 
developing infrastructure;
•
•
Who’s in charge of the reforms?
Members of the Committee on Economic Reforms:
Viktor Yanukovych, President and Chair
Mykola Azarov, Premier
Borys Kolesnikov, Deputy Premier
Andriy Kliuyev, First Deputy Premier
Volodymyr Semynozhenko, Deputy Premier
Viktor Slauta, Deputy Premier
Viktor Tikhonov, Deputy Premier
Serhiy Tihipko, Deputy Premier
Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Oleksandr Lavrynovych, Minister of Justice of Ukraine
Anatoliy Tolstoukhov, Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers
Serhiy Liovochkin, Presidential Chief-of-Staff
Iryna Akimova, First Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Presidential representative to the Cabinet, Executive Secretary
Olena Lukash, First Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Presidential representative to the Constitutional Court
Hanna Herman, Deputy Chief-of-Staff
Volodymyr Stelmakh, Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine
Mykola Derkach, Chair, VR Budget Committee
Oleksandr Tkachenko, Chair, VR Economic Policy Committee
Valeriy Hayets, Director, Institute of Economics and Forecasting
Valeriy Hladkiy, Director, Bureau for Economic and Social Technologies
Andriy Yermolayev, Director, National Institute of Strategic Studies
Ella Libanova, Director, Institute of Demographics and Social Studies
Dmytro Leonov, Dean, Ukrainian Institute of Stock Market Development
Anatoliy Pavlenko, Dean, Kyiv National Economic University
Ihor Mitiukov, Director, Morgan Stanley Ukraine
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Setting suitable conditions for regional develop-
ment;
Launching a new level of international integra-
tion and economic co-operation;
Reforming the social sphere.
Right now, these priorities are not enough to deter-
mine whether a serious reform plan will be drafted 
by the Committee. The President has given it 60 
days to do so.
Deputy Premier Tihipko is to be the counterpart of 
the Committee within the Cabinet of Ministers in 
dealing with issues of sustainable economic devel-
opment. Mr. Tihipko occupied the very same posi-
tion in 997-999 and resigned at the time, stating 
that he could not affect the course of events in the 
Government. It is not very likely that this time any-
thing will drastically change with this same posi-
tion.
The position of Deputy Premier is horizontal in 
nature and entails only “political supervision” of 
the Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Finance. 
Economy Minister Vasyl Tsushko was previously 
Minister of Interior in the Yanukovych Government 
of 2006-2007. Himself an ex-socialist, he occupies 
the position on the Communist Party quota. Finance 
Minister Fedir Yaroshenko is known to be loyal to 
Mr. Azarov and previously headed Tax Administra-
tion.
Overall, the new team has stated its intention to un-
dertake reforms. Alas, Ukrainian Governments have 
become so skilled in the pretense of effort that only 
actual performance will offer something to evaluate 
and trust.
•
•
•
Get the state back on track!
For any Government accomplishing a task requires 
a working state. Ukraine is hardly a failed state, but 
it is definitely failing in the services it is supposed to 
deliver to its citizens and its private sector.
Even if the central government comes up with a 
masterpiece of a plan for deregulation, it is likely to 
be buried. It could go down in the corridors of power 
or at the implementation stage in individual agen-
cies and local officials.
Political power, whatever its color, usually loses 
elections to its opposition, often undermined by the 
bureaucracy’s inability to deliver the improvements 
in quality of life that voters expect. Despite willing-
ness to engage in reforms, the current team could 
well underestimate the danger that an unreformed 
civil service poses to the tasks the politicians hope 
to accomplish.
President Yanukovych stated in a recent interview6 
that he understands the danger a corrupt civil ser-
vice poses to his initiatives and stressed that a spe-
cial anti-corruption bureau armed with brand-new 
anti-corruption powers will soon be in place. It re-
mains to be seen if this bureau will understand that 
fighting corruption means removing opportunities 
for corruption rather than catching and punishing 
corrupt bureaucrats. The Advisory Anti-Corrup-
tion Committee created by Presidential is currently 
working on the concept for an anti-corruption cam-
paign.
The problem with the public service is its inefficient 
organization. It is reminiscent of the vertical USSR 
structure. The only big difference from the Soviet 
Union is that the chain of command are now linked 
to strong interest groups.
6 http://unian.net/ukr/news/news-3682.html
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The Constitutional “reform” of 2004—an unhealthy 
compromise with the Orange Revolution—was one 
of the reasons why the Orange team failed. Public 
officials learnt too well how to simulate activity and 
avoid scrutiny on behalf of politicians.
The new team understands the need to “get the state 
back on track.” They are likely to try to streamline 
bureaucracy through the soviet method of increas-
ing discipline. These efforts are at high risk of fail-
ure: at best, they will lead to temporary high-profile 
improvements but to a restoration of the status quo 
in the long term.
Streamlining the judiciary branch is on the priority 
list of the new Government. A Committee on judicia-
ry reform headed by Justice Minister Lavrynovych 
has already been set up by the President.7 The task 
is of foremost importance for Ukraine, but the effec-
tiveness of this group can only be verified by time.
Without a system of institutionally independent 
control over the government bureaucracy, all re-
form efforts risk failing. Just trying to improve poli-
ticians’ management of the state machine will not 
be enough. Only a change in the principles under-
lying the civil service can make it results-oriented 
and compatible with the reality of democracy and 
private property.
Redefine the state’s role in the economy!
In Ukraine, the state is still far too involved in the 
economy and that involvement is hardly positive. 
State monopolies such as railway giant Ukrzaliz-
nytsia, gas monopolist Naftogaz, highway agency 
Ukravtodor, and fixed-line provider Ukrtelecom 
were all on the verge of default recently because of 
problems servicing their debts.
Instead of providing infrastructure and energy ser-
vices, state monopolies contributed to Ukraine’s 
widening fiscal gap and became a drag on the coun-
try’s economy. Indeed, these natural monopolies 
are likely to restrict economic growth in the near-
est future as deteriorating infrastructure and lack of 
7 http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/0736.html
high quality energy services create bottlenecks for 
the growing private sector.
State giants fail not only because of virulent corrup-
tion that spreads from the bureaucratic machine. 
Lack of modern regulation is also to blame. Under 
the influence of interest groups that control the 
state monopolies and politicians who don’t want to 
lose rents from these enterprises, Ukraine’s regula-
tors have never become properly independent.
Natural gas and other utilities should become the 
primary focus of reforms, as these sectors continue 
to rely on the public purse for unjustified support 
while angering consumers with the low quality of 
their services.
Increase productivity!
By 2008, Ukraine had recovered from the economic 
collapse brought on with the breakdown of the So-
viet Union. Today, there is no spare production ca-
pacity that can demonstrate high growth rates. Sus-
tainable economic growth must now become driven 
by growth in productivity of both capital and labor 
or Ukraine will be doomed to economic stagnation.
Studies show that Ukraine’s growth is currently con-
strained not for lack of labor, capital or technology. 
The main reason for future suboptimal performance 
will be its market-unfriendly institutional environ-
ment.
Even such pillars of the market economy as the in-
stitution of property rights are of low quality. Raider 
attacks have become more frequent recently, with 
up to seven enterprises attacked a day.8 With the 
state not able to properly protect property rights, it 
is hard to expect great economic results.
Ukraine’s institutions remain like the mythical cen-
taur: a Soviet body below the waist topped by a mar-
ket-oriented torso. In other words, Ukraine’s com-
mercial laws and regulations are of poor quality and 
inadequate, so the problem is not lack of implemen-
tation. The Government needs to undertake serious 
8 http://news.liga.net/news/N006439.html
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legislative work if it wants to improve the business 
climate in the country.
The economic cost of ineffective institutions is 
huge. According to IFC estimates, compliance with 
just three regulatory procedures—technical regu-
lations, inspections and permits—cost Ukraine’s 
economy US $.55bn in labor, direct expenses and 
unofficial payments in 2008 alone.
Advice on how to deregulate the business environ-
ment is ample and has been on the table for many 
years. But due to the previous economic boom, the 
bureaucratic machine did not feel any incentive to 
change and lose a huge chunk of its profit from this 
growth—in the form of bribes.
Increasing the productivity of Ukraine’s labor and 
capital and putting it on track for sustainable eco-
nomic development should become the main prior-
ity of future reforms. Otherwise, Ukraine may not 
find resources for other reforms or for any improve-
ment in the well-being of its citizens.
Turning patchwork into a roadmap
Ukraine’s Government is feeling enough pressure 
to act swiftly in closing the huge fiscal gap and re-
storing macroeconomic stability. If this is done in a 
matter of weeks, the solutions will inevitably be a 
patchwork.
The risky side of finding quick solutions is the temp-
tation to resort to tax extortion or to quick-fixes that 
will further shake weak institutional boundaries.
The patchwork of early days must be followed up by 
serious legislative work to prevent the same prob-
lems from recurring in the nearest future.
To get to the roots of Ukraine’s problems, the Gov-
ernment needs to take a more strategic approach to 
reform, which it has pledged to do. Still, Ukraine’s 
politicians are all too adept at mimicking reform, 
so only actual performance will bring the new team 
credibility.
There remains a chance that, even if the right priori-
ties are chosen for reform efforts, they will be sabo-
taged by an inefficient bureaucracy and corruption. 
Still, Ukraine now has a unique opportunity to move 
forward with reforms and get on track for sustain-
able development—an opportunity that, if wasted, 
might not be there for many years to come.
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April 1
Construction starts on the first line of Nord 
Stream.
April 5
EU Visa Code enters into force.
April 7–8
UEFA President Michel Platini visits Ukraine to 
inspect construction sites at hosting airports and 
stadiums.
April 12–13
President Yanukovych visits Washington DC.
The President will participate in the Global 
Nuclear Security Summit and meet President 
Obama, Vice President Biden and State Secre-
tary Clinton, as well as the Heads of the IMF and 
the World Bank.
April 20–21
CIS Coal Summit takes place in Moscow.
April 22
UN Earth Day celebrates 40 years.
April 25
Local Elections take place in Belarus.
April 26
The 24th anniversary of the Chornobyl disaster is 
commemorated.
The Foreign Affairs and Defense Council of the 
EU meets.
April 27
The EU Commission presents its Draft Budget 
for 20.
April 30
The European External Action Service, the EU’s 
diplomatic service, is set up.
Dates unspecified
Ukraine’s 200 State Budget is adopted. (mid 
April)
President Yanukovych makes an official visit to 
Belarus.
Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim 
bin Jabr Al Thani comes to Ukraine—first official 
visit of a Qatari PM to Ukraine in the history of 
bilateral relations.
The committee for economic cooperation of the 
Ukraine-Russia interstate commission meets.
The section of the Readmission Treaty between 
Ukraine and the EU pertaining to Third Country 
Nationals comes into effect.
The next round of UN climate change negotia-
tions take place under the UNFCCC.
Key Events in April
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